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ABSTRACT  
We analyze the rate of formation, the characteristics, and the performance of different types 
of  new  firms  in  Sweden  over  a  decade.  Comparisons  to  Denmark,  Brazil,  and  the  U.S. 
suggest that the environment for new firm formation in Sweden is not markedly different than 
elsewhere. In line with previous studies, spinoffs of incumbents perform better than other 
types of new firms, particularly if their parent firm continues to operate. A novel findings is 
that the rate of employment growth of spinoffs is greater the larger the size of their parent, 
which contrast sharply with findings for firms with a single owner. 
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Abstract 
We analyze the rate of formation, the characteristics, and the performance of different 
types of new firms in Sweden over a decade. Comparisons to Denmark, Brazil, and the 
U.S. suggest that the environment for new firm formation in Sweden is not markedly 
different than elsewhere. In line with previous studies, spinoffs of incumbents perform 
better than other types of new firms, particularly if their parent firm continues to operate. 
A novel findings is that the rate of employment growth of spinoffs is greater the larger 
the  size  of  their  parent,  which  contrast  sharply with findings for firms with a single 
owner. 
 
JEL classification: M13, J60 
Key  words:  Sweden,  spinoffs,  new  firm  formation,  entrepreneurship,  performance, 
employment growth  
[Running Title: Spinoffs in Sweden] 
  
  1
Characteristics and Performance of New Firms and Spinoffs in Sweden 
1. Introduction 
New firms are the lifeblood of any economy. While they come from many quarters, many 
are founded by individuals who are employees of private firms. Yet we know little about 
the process of employees leaving established firms to found their own firms. Which firms 
are  more  likely  to  have  employees  leave  to  found  their  own  firms?  What  types  of 
employees  are  more  likely  to  found  their  own  firms?  What  types  of  firms  do  they 
foundﾗ—to  what  extent  are  they  like  the  firms  they  leave?  What  is  the  impetus  for 
employees to leave to found their own firmsﾗ—to what extent are employees responding 
to positive opportunities to found new firms versus being pushed into founding their own 
firms due to the failure of their employers? How does the background of the employees 
and the firms they previously worked for affect the performance of the firms they found? 
The purpose of this paper is to begin exploring these questions for Sweden. To make 
headway on the questions for any country or region, a comprehensive dataset on new 
firms and their employees is required. Sweden is one of the countries in the world where 
such information has been compiled for recent years in a dataset that matches employees 
to their employers, providing  rich information  on all  establishments  and  firms  in the 
economy and the individuals they employ. We exploit this dataset to identify all new 
firms in the private sector in Sweden annually for the period 1993 to 2005 and also new 
establishments created by existing firms. 
New firms are divided into single-person firms and those that employ two or more 
individuals.  The  latter  are  further  divided  according  to  whether  a  majority  of  their 
founders came from the same firm, which we call spinoffs, and all other new firms.  
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Spinoffs  are  further  distinguished  according  to  whether  the  establishment  they  came 
from, which we call their parent, exited in the year the spinoff was founded. We also 
single out new firms that were divested by existing firms and new establishments created 
by existing firms. Our analysis focuses especially on spinoffs, exploring the inclination of 
employees to found them and the factors underlying their performance. 
One of our goals is also to compare the process underlying the creation of new firms in 
Sweden  with  other  countries.  The  Swedish  economy  has  a  number  of  distinctive 
characteristics  related  to  how  firms  are  governed  and  to  public  involvement  in  the 
industrial sector. We focus on how these characteristics may have influenced the creation 
and performance of spinoffs. We design our analysis to conform as closely as possible to 
a prior analysis of spinoffs that was conducted for Denmark using the Danish matched 
employer-employee dataset (Eriksson and Kuhn [2006]), facilitating a comparison of our 
findings  with  those  for  Denmark.  We  also  compare  our  findings  to  a  similar  study 
recently conducted for Brazil using their matched employer-employee dataset (Hirakawa, 
Muendler,  and  Rauch  [2009]).  Elfenbein,  Hamilton,  and  Zenger  [2010]  analyze  the 
creation of new firms by scientists and engineers working for private firms in the U.S., 
and we compare out findings for Swedish scientists and engineers to Elfenbein et al.ﾒ’s 
findings.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the main findings of prior 
studies of spinoffs and new firms at the national and industry level. In Section 3 we 
review industrial developments in Sweden and describe salient features of the modern 
Swedish industrial economy that might bear on the formation of spinoffs and other types 
of new firms. In Section 4 we describe the Swedish matched employer-employee dataset  
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and the types of new establishments that we distinguish. We also we provide statistics on 
the importance and nature of each type of new establishment and compare the patterns to 
other countries that have been studied similarly. In Section 5 we analyze the types of 
employees that found new establishments of varying kinds. In Section 6 we analyze the 
performance  of  the  new  establishments  and  how  they  relate  to  characteristics  of  the 
employees and their parents. In Section 7 we discuss our findings and offer concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Prior Spinoff Findings 
Various empirical studies featuring spinoffs have been conducted. We first review the 
main findings of these studies and then discuss alternative theoretical interpretations of 
the findings. 
A number of studies of spinoffs and new firm formation have been conducted at the 
level of entire countries using matched employer-employee datasets and at the level of 
industries using hand-collected data. Country studies have been conducted for Denmark 
(Eriksson and Kuhn [2006], Dahl and Reichstein [2007], Sørensen [2007], Sørenson and 
Phillips [2011]), Brazil (Hirakawa et al. [2009]), Norway (Hvide [2009]), and Portugal 
(Baptista and Karaöz [2006]). For the U.S., Elfenbein et al. [2010] used longitudinal 
survey data to study the formation of new firms by scientists and engineers. Industry 
studies  have  typically  focused  on  new  manufacturing  industries  during  their  early, 
formative  era.  Klepper  [2009]  provides  a  recent  review  of  these  studies  and  their 
theoretical implications.  
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The  industry  studies  generally  have  data  on  the  founders  of  all  entrants  and  their 
backgrounds. In contrast, other than Hvide [2009] and Baptista and Karaöz [2006], the 
country studies cannot identify founders of incorporated firms and/or those with multiple 
initial employees. Either these firms were excluded from the analysis, as in Sørenson and 
Phillips [2011], or their founders were inferred through some kind of rule. Distinctions 
were generally made between self-employment (new firms with a single owner and/or a 
single employee), spinoffs (new firms typically with a majority of initial employees that 
previously worked at the same establishment, which was denoted as their ﾓ“parentﾔ”), and 
other new firms. Further, spinoffs were typically distinguished according to whether their 
parent exited in the year they entered, which are called pushed spinoffs, and those whose 
parents continued after they entered, which are called pulled spinoffs.   
A number of common findings emerge from the studies. High-level workers, including 
managers  and  technical  specialists,  are  more  likely  to  found  firms.  A  number  of  the 
country studies examine the effect of a workerﾒ’s tenure and the size of the workerﾒ’s 
establishment  on  the  probability  of  leaving  his  employer  for  various  destinations, 
including  founding  a  new  firm.  Both  factors  reduce  the  probability  of  leaving  the 
workerﾒ’s  employer,  and  even  more  so  reduce  the  probability  of  leaving  to  found  a 
spinoff.  The  country  studies  commonly  find  that  spinoffs,  and  in  particular  pulled 
spinoffs, are initially larger and perform better than all other types of startups, particularly 
at younger ages. They also find that spinoffs that enter the same industry as their parent 
perform better than other spinoffs, which is consistently found in the industry studies.  
The main issue where the various studies diverge concerns the relationship between the 
size of the parent and the performance of its offspring. The country studies by Sørensen  
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[2007], Elfenbein et al. [2010], and Sørenson and Phillips [2011] find that the larger a 
new firmﾒ’s parent is, then the worse on average its performance in terms of the income of 
its  founders  and  the  longevity  of  the  firm.  These  three  studies  mainly  focus  on 
individually  owned  new  firms.  Hvide  [2009],  in  contrast,  focuses  on  incorporated 
spinoffs with two or more initial employees and a majority owner. He finds that the rate 
of return on assets of the spinoff is greater the larger its parent firm. The industry studies, 
which  appear  to  involve  mostly  incorporated  entrants  with  multiple  employees, 
consistently find that spinoffs of larger, better performing firms in their industry perform 
better. 
The common findings of the studies suggest that the work experience of employees 
conditions the quality of the firms they could form. High-level workers learn the most 
about  the  kinds  of  organizational  challenges  they  will  face  in  their  own  firms.  An 
employeeﾒ’s experience is more valuable if he starts a firm in the same industry in which 
he previously worked. The performance of a new firm is better if it is motivated by a new 
idea rather than the preservation of jobs following the failure or imminent failure of its 
parent. One interpretation of the divergent findings about firm size is that the value of 
work experience in a smaller firm might depend on the type of firm an employee founds. 
Singly owned firms are smaller and founders of such firms might learn more from work 
experience in smaller firms, whereas founders of incorporated firms might learn more 
from experience in larger incorporated firms. Alternatively, it could be that larger firms 
are more bureaucratic and less able to spot good ideas, providing their employees with 
better ideas to found their own firms (Hvide [2009]). 
  
  6
3. The Swedish Economy and Issues Related to Spinoffs 
Sweden has prospered over the last 150 years or so, but in modern times its growth 
slowed for a number of years before picking up again recently. This slowdown raised 
concerns about the environment for startups of all kinds, including spinoffs (Henrekson 
[2005]). In this section we consider distinctive features of the Swedish economy bearing 
on the formation of new firms. 
We first consider recent macroeconomic developments in Sweden. Figure 1 reports 
GDP per capita (in 2011 U.S. dollars) from 1950 to 2005 in Sweden and on average in 
the  other  OECD  countries.  GDP  per  capita  was  greater  in  Sweden  than  the  average 
OECD country from 1950 until the sharp recession of the Swedish economy in the early 
1990s. From 1975 until 1993, however, growth in GDP per capita in Sweden slowed 
down relative to its past growth and relative to the other OECD countries (Henrekson 
[1996]). This caused Sweden to drop sharply in its ranking of GDP per capita among the 
most  advanced  countries  in  the  world.  Correspondingly,  investment  in  Sweden  as  a 
percent of GDP also declined after 1975 both relative to its past and other advanced 
countries.  As  reflected  in  Figure  1,  Swedenﾒ’s  performance  improved  after  the  early 
1990s,  and  by  2004  its  level  of  GDP  per  capita  was  again  in  line  with  its  OECD 
counterparts.  
One factor that may have contributed to the slow growth in Sweden in modern times is 
a low rate of self-employment and new firm formation. Sweden usually gets a low rank in 
international  comparisons  of r a t e s  o f  s e l f - e m p l o y m e n t ,  n e w  f i r m  f o r m a t i o n ,  a n d  
entrepreneurship. For example, Delmar and Davidsson (2000) found that Sweden had a 
low  rate  of  nascent  entrepreneurship  compared  to  Norway  and  the  US.  The  Global  
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Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a survey-based study of entrepreneurship in different 
countries, rated Sweden lower than other innovation-driven countries in terms of ﾓ“total 
early-stage entrepreneurship activityﾔ” in its recent 2010 report.
1 Consistent with a low 
rate of new firm formation, Swedenﾒ’s leading firms are quite old. As of 2000, the 50 
largest Swedish firms were all founded before 1970, with all but eight founded before 
1946 and many founded in the nineteenth century (Högfeldt [2005]). Swedenﾒ’s leading 
firms are predominantly concentrated in older, capital intensive industries dominated by 
large firms. Compared to other advanced countries, the Swedish firm-size distribution is 
tilted toward large firms (Davis and Henrekson [1999]), though the fraction of large firms 
has  fallen  in  recent years  (Henrekson  and  Stenkula  [2006]).  In  part,  this  reflects  the 
industries  in  which  Sweden  has  specialized,  including:  paper,  pulp,  and  related 
machinery;  materials  mining,  processing,  and  related  machinery;  transportation 
equipment; power generation  equipment; and  telecommunications equipment  (Sölvell, 
Zander, and Porter [1999]). These industries are capital intensive, pay above average but 
not the highest wages, and are characterized by firms of above average size. In modern 
times these industries have not grown rapidly and Swedish firms have been challenged by 
firms from developing countries, which may have contributed to the modern slowdown in 
Swedish growth. As noted in the prior section, larger firms also generate less spinoffs per 
employee, which may have contributed to a low rate of new firm formation in Sweden. 
Swedish firms are also highly oriented internationally, which may have influenced the 
creation of new enterprises and growth in Sweden in recent years. Despite its small size, 
Sweden has been ranked as the tenth largest foreign investor in the world, led by many 
large multi-national enterprises (MNEs) (Blomström [2000]). In the mid-1990s Swedish  
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MNEs had more than 50% of their employees in foreign locations. This is nearly twice 
the  percentage  in  1970,  with  total  employment  of  the  MNEs  falling  in  Sweden  and 
growing markedly elsewhere in recent years. In contrast to the U.S., Swedish MNEs 
appear to be transferring more and more advanced operations abroad, as reflected in a 
sharp rise in the wages of labor employed by Swedish MNEs outside of Sweden both 
absolutely and relative to the wages paid by these firms in Sweden. Swedish MNEs still 
do the bulk of their R&D in Sweden, but seem to be transferring their other advanced 
activities,  including  more  high-tech  production,  elsewhere  (Blomström  [2000], 
Braunerhjelm and Ekholm [1998]). This may have reduced the base of operations in 
Sweden from which new firms could emerge. 
The  Swedish  policy  environment  is  distinctive  in  ways  that  might  also  have 
discouraged the formation of new firms. In modern times, Sweden has had the highest 
ratio of taxes to GDP among OECD countries. The effective top marginal tax rate on 
labor  income  in  Sweden  exceeded  90%  as  late  as  1983  (Du  Rietz,  Johansson,  and 
Stenkula [2011a, p. 44]) and was even higher on capital income earned by entrepreneurs 
(Du Rietz, Stenkula, and Johansson [2011b, p. 27]). Furthermore, stock options were 
taxed unfavorably relative to the U.S. and other countries, which surely made it more 
difficult  for  new  firms  to  recruit  workers  in  industries  that  rely  on  stock  options  to 
motivate employees (Henrekson [2005]). 
In 1991 Sweden engaged in a major tax reform that sharply reduced taxes on labor 
income and also on the returns to founding a new firm (Sørenson [2010]). This together 
with subsequent changes led to a fall of almost four percentage points in the ratio of tax 
revenues to GDP between 1990 and 2007. In contrast, the comparable tax burden for the  
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average OECD country increased by two percentage points in the same period. While this 
certainly improved the climate for entrepreneurship, tax rates and tax revenues relative to 
GDP  remained  high  in  Sweden  relative  to  many  other  OECD  countries  (Sørenson 
[2010]). 
 Sweden has various employee security provisions and wage policies that may also 
discourage the formation of new firms (Davis and Henrekson [1999]). Strong employee 
security provisions may, for example, be harmful to new firms that need to modify their 
initial  workforce.  In  recent  years  the  regulations  for  temporary  contracts  have  been 
relaxed,  although  Swedenﾒ’s strong  security provisions  for  permanent employees have 
remained  intact  (Skedinger  [2012]).  As  of  2007  employees  are  granted  tenure 
immediately or they are on temporary contracts for a maxium of two years. Concerns 
have also been raised that centralized wage setting could limit the extent to which smaller 
firms can pay lower wages, as occurs in other countries. Workers in Sweden are also 
subject to the last-in-first-out (LIFO) principle, which requires the firm to let go of the 
most recently hired worker if it downsizes. This may limit the ability of new firms to 
recruit seasoned workers.
2  
These characteristics of the Swedish economy raise a number of questions regarding 
spinoffs in Sweden that we focus on in our analysis. 
x  Does Sweden have a low rate of spinoffs from incumbent firms relative to other 
advanced countries after controlling for factors such as firm size that appear to 
negatively affect the spinoff rate?  
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x  Has Swedish growth suffered until recent years because of a low rate of formation 
of  spinoffs  in  the  same  industry  as  their  ﾓ“parentﾔ”  firm  (i.e.,  intra-industry 
spinoffs)?  
x  To what extent is the formation of new firms by employees in Swedish MNEs 
discouraged  by  the  same  factors  that  discourage  the  MNEs  from  performing 
downstream work in Sweden?  
x  Has there been a rise in the formation of new firms and spinoffs in particular 
during our sample period of 1993ﾖ–2005 in response to the Swedish tax reforms 
initiated in 1991? 
 
4.  The  Matched  Employer-Employee  Dataset  and  the  Composition  of  New 
Establishments and New Firms 
In this section we provide an overview of the various types of new establishments and 
new firms founded in Sweden over the period 1993 to 2005 and compare the rate of 
formation of new firms in Sweden with other countries. 
 
4.1 Data 
Our  data  on  new  establishments  and  firms  are  drawn  from  the  Swedish  matched 
employer-employee  dataset  for  the  period  1993ﾖ–2005.  The  dataset  comprises  all 
establishments,  firms,  and  employed  individuals  in  the  country.  Each  individualﾒ’s 
employer (establishment/firm) is determined annually by his place of work in the month 
of November. For each establishment and firm, the total number of employees and sector 
affiliation  at the  5-digit  NACE level are  reported.  For 1997ﾖ–2005, balance-sheet  and  
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ownership data are available for every firm. The balance-sheet data provide information 
on sales, value added, gross profits, wages, and debts. The ownership data distinguish 
between non-affiliated firms and firms affiliated with domestic corporations, Swedish 
MNEs, and foreign-owned MNEs. For employees, gender, income, employment status, 
education (length and subject degree), and place of residence, birth, and study (for those 
attending universities) are reported annually. 
 
4.2 Types of New Firms 
We  identify  new  establishments  created  by  existing  firms  and  new  establishments 
founded by new firms on a yearly basis from 1993 to 2005. The identification of a new 
firm is based on a combination of the appearance of new firm id-codes (organization 
numbers) and information on employee-flows at the level of establishments between each 
pair of years.
3 Among the new establishments created by existing firms, we divide them 
into  new  establishments  in  the  firmﾒ’s  main  two-digit  industry,  which  we  consider 
expansions, and all other establishments, which represent diversifications.  
New establishments founded by new firms are divided initially into five categories: 
divestitures;  self-employed;  pushed  spinoffs;  pulled  spinoffs;  and  other  new  firms. 
Following Eriksson and Kuhn [2006], divestitures include all new firms with over 10 
employees. These firms are assumed to be reorganizations of activities that previously 
took place at an incumbent firm. The self-employment category is composed of new 
firms with only one employee.
4 The other three categories are composed of new firms 
with between two and ten employees. We do not have information about the founders of 
these  firms,  which  was  the  same  situation  faced  by  Eriksson  and  Kuhn  [2006].  
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Consequently, we follow their strategy of defining spinoffs according to the origins of 
their  initial  employees.  If  more  than  50%  of  the  employees  worked  at  the  same 
establishment in the previous year and constituted 50% or less of the workforce at that 
establishment, we call this a spinoff and the establishment where they worked is called 
the spinoffﾒ’s parent. If the parent establishment exited in the same year as the spinoff, the 
spinoff is classified as a pushed spinoff; otherwise it is classified as a pulled spinoff. All 
other new firms with two to ten employees that do not have a majority of their initial 
employees coming from one establishment are put into the residual category of other new 
firms. This residual category is further divided into two groups according to whether or 
not all their employees were not employed the previous year. 
 
4.3 New Establishments, New Firms, and Spinoffs in Sweden ﾖ– the Basic Pattern 
For the period 1993 to 2005, Table 1 reports the annual number of new establishments 
created by existing firms in their main two-digit NACE industry and in other industries 
and  the  annual  number  of  new  firms  that  were  divestitures,  self-employed,  pushed 
spinoffs, pulled spinoffs, composed initially of all previously not employed workers, and 
all other new firms. Table 2 reports the number of employees for each group of new 
establishments and firms in Table 1. 
The annual number of new establishments of new firms was around 50,000 per year 
versus 200 to 300 new establishments per year created by existing firms outside their 
main two-digit industry and 2,000ﾖ–3,000 new establishments per year created by existing 
firms in their main industry. The majority of the new establishments of new firms, around 
42,000  per  year,  had  only  one  employee.  Among  the  other  8,000  or  so  new  
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establishments of new firms, in most years 400 to 500 were divestitures, 200 to 300 were 
pushed  spinoffs,  900  to  1,000  were  pulled  spinoffs,  900  to  1,300 were  composed of 
previously not employed individuals, and 5,000 to 6,000 were in the residual category of 
other new firms. 
In terms of employment, Table 2 indicates that new establishments created by existing 
firms, and by definition divestitures, initially were markedly larger than the various types 
of  new  firms  with  employees,  as  is  generally  true  in  other  countries.  The  new 
establishments  created  by  existing  firms,  both  in  their  main  industry  and  otherwise, 
initially  averaged  around  seven  employees  and  divestitures  averaged  around  25 
employees versus 2.2ﾖ–3.5 employees for the various types of new firms with employees. 
Among the new establishments of new firms with employees, pushed and pulled spinoffs 
were initially the largest, averaging 3.5 and 3.3 employees respectively. The new firms 
founded by previously not employed individuals were the smallest with an average of 2.2 
initial  employees  and  the  other  new  firms  in t h e  r e s i d u a l  c a t e g o r y  a v e r a g e d  3 . 1  
employees initially.  
Within our sample period, the most notable patterns were a decline over time in the 
number of new establishments created by existing firms outside their main industry and a 
rise over time in the number of pulled spinoffs. The former peaked at 599 in 1997 and 
reached a low of 162 in 2005 and the latter attained a low of 673 in 1995 and peaked at 
1,049 in 2005. The number of divestitures also varied considerably over time, reaching a 
peak in the period 1999 to 2001. This corresponds to the dot.com bubble, and during this 
three-year period over 40% of the divestitures were in knowledge-based services (which 
includes IT services) versus 32% over the whole period. The number of new firms with  
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all previously not employed workers also varied considerably over time. Not surprisingly, 
it was highest during the early years of our sample when Sweden experienced a sharp 
recession and more individuals were unemployed. 
The  fall  over  time  in  the  number  of  new  establishments  created  by  existing  firms 
outside their main industry could reflect the increasing transfer of advanced activities by 
Swedish MNEs to other countries noted earlier. However, over the period 1997 to 2005 
for which we have data on MNE affiliation, there is no clear trend in the percentage of 
these new establishments that were created by MNEs.
5 We also did not find that Swedish 
MNEs were less likely to spawn spinoffs over the period for which we had data on MNE 
affiliation (1997ﾖ–2005).
6 The rise over time in the number of pulled spinoffs is intriguing 
and conceivably could be due to the fall in Swedish tax rates. However, there is no clear 
upward trend in the number of other types of new firms, and it is not clear why lower tax 
rates should have favored only the formation of pulled spinoffs.  
 
4.4 The Swedish Pattern in a Comparative Perspective 
We exploit studies of spinoffs and new firm creation in Denmark (Eriksson and Kuhn 
[2006]) and Brazil (Hirakawa et al. [2009]) using matched employer-employee datasets 
for those countries to put the Swedish patterns in perspective. The study of Denmark is 
especially useful for this purpose as it is much closer in size to Sweden than Brazil. We 
also followed many of the conventions adopted in the paper on Denmark, including using 
the same definition of pushed and pulled spinoffs, to facilitate the comparison of Sweden 
and Denmark.   
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The Danish study covers the period 1981 to 2000, and at its mid-point in 1990 the 
population of Denmark was approximately 5 million people. The midpoint of our study is 
1999 when the population of Sweden was roughly 9 million people. So Sweden might be 
expected to have about twice as many firms in each category per year as Denmark. 
The Danish study does not consider new establishments created by existing firms but 
only new firms that entered in the period 1981 to 2000. On an annual basis, the average 
number of new firms in Denmark was approximately 5,000 self-employed, 1,600 with a 
majority of employees not employed in the prior year, 107 pushed spinoffs, 351 pulled 
spinoffs, and 1,665 in the residual category of other new firms. The analogous figures for 
Sweden  are  42,000  self-employed,  1,259  firms  for  which  all  the  employees  were 
previously not employed, 282 pushed spinoffs, 880 pulled spinoffs, and 5,578 in the 
residual  category  of  other  new  firms.  One  pronounced  difference  between  the  two 
countries is the number of new self-employed firms, which are over five times as great in 
Sweden. This is suspect, though, as Denmarkﾒ’s self-employment rate is comparable if not 
greater than Swedenﾒ’s.
7 We suspect the difference in the number of new self-employed 
firms  is  attributable  to  self-employed  individuals  being  registered  differently  in  the 
Danish dataset than in Sweden.  
Where the figures should be most comparable is in pushed and pulled spinoffs, as the 
same  definitions  were  employed.  The  average  annual  number  of  pushed  and  pulled 
spinoffs  together  is  458  in  Denmark  versus 1 , 1 6 1  i n  S w e d e n .  G i v e n  t h a t  S w e d e n  i s  
roughly twice as large as Denmark, this suggests that Sweden had a comparable if not 
greater number of pushed and pulled spinoffs per capita than Denmark. The balance 
between pushed and pulled spinoffs is similar in the two countries, with both countries  
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having about three times as many pulled as pushed spinoffs. In terms of all other new 
firms, including both ones with all or majority of employees that were previously not 
employed, the average number in Denmark was 3,265 versus 6,837 in Sweden. This too 
is roughly in line with differences in the size of the two countries. In summary, apart 
from  the  number  of  new  self-employed  firms,  the  patterns  in  Denmark  and  Sweden 
regarding the entry of new firms are similar. 
 B r a z i l   i s   m u c h   l a r g e r   t h a n   S w e d e n ,   w i t h   a   p o p u l a t i o n   o f   a r o u n d   1 7 0   m i l l i o n   i n  
1998, which is the midpoint of the time period 1995ﾖ–2001 considered in the study of 
spinoffs in Brazil. Consequently, it might be expected that new firms in Brazil would be 
larger than in Sweden, and in the relevant analyses Hirakawa et al. [2009] consider only 
new establishments (or ventures, which include multiple new establishments by the same 
firm) with five or more employees. Regarding spinoffs, they define a spinoff as a new 
firm  with  five  or  more  employees,  with  at  least  25%  of  the  employees  previously 
employed at the same establishment and accounting for less than 70% of the workforce of 
that establishment. No distinction is made between pushed and pulled spinoffs. They use 
various criteria to identify new firms that were divestitures, which are excluded from the 
count of spinoffs. They also report the number of new establishments created by existing 
firms in their main four-digit industry and in other industries and the number of other new 
firms (with five or more employees). 
In Brazil the average number of spinoffs was 13,893 per year and the average number 
of other new firms was 30,948 per year. This compares with 1,161 pulled and pushed 
spinoffs and 6,837 other new firms per year (including firms whose employees were all 
not  employed  in  the  prior  year)  in  Sweden u s i n g  t h e  s m a l l e r  c u t o f f  o f  t w o  i n i t i a l   
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employees. The 13,893 spinoffs per year (with five or more employees) is roughly 12 
times the annual number of spinoffs in Sweden (with two to ten employees) whereas the 
30,948 other new firms (with five or more employees) per year in Brazil is only about 4.5 
times  the  6,837  other  new  firms  (with  two  to  ten  employees)  per  year  in  Sweden. 
Expressed  alternatively,  Brazil  has  a  much  higher  percentage  of  new  firms  with 
employees that are spinoffs (around 31%; 13,983/44,931) than Sweden (around 15%; 
1,161/7,998),  where  both  groups  in  Brazil  are  standardized  by  having  five  or  more 
employees and in Sweden by having between 2 and 10 employees. Alternatively, if the 
base used for comparison is the number of new establishments founded by existing firms, 
the picture is different. The average annual number of new establishments outside their 
main  industry  founded  by  existing  firms  was  263  in  Sweden  versus  4,961  such 
diversification ventures with five or more employees in Brazil. Therefore, the number of 
spinoffs  relative  to  diversifications  was  4.4  for  Sweden  and  2.8  for  Brazil.  On  this 
standard, the number of spinoffs is not low in Sweden relative to Brazil. However, this 
may also reflect that both spinoffs and the number of new establishments created by 
existing firms are low in Sweden relative to Brazil. 
 
4.5 Distribution of New Establishments, Firms, and Incumbents by Broad Sectors 
Table 3 provides information about the broad sectors entered by the various types of new 
establishments  and  firms  in  Sweden.  Apart  from  the  new  establishments  created  by 
existing firms outside their main sector and new self-employed establishments, over 70% 
of the new firms entered in private services and another 5% to 10% in public services. 
These patterns reflect that the only sector that has grown in total employment since the  
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early 1990s in Sweden is services, which is a pattern also seen in other OECD countries.
8 
Self-employed firms are distinctive in that nearly 30% entered in agriculture, fishing, and 
extraction. The new establishments of incumbent  firms  outside their  main sector  had 
much higher percentages in manufacturing and public services, roughly 21% in each, 
than the other types of new establishments.  
An unreported breakdown of new firms in the manufacturing sector indicates that the 
spinoffs were somewhat more likely to enter more technologically progressive industries 
than other new firms. Over 50% of both pushed and pulled spinoffs entered the same 
two-digit sector as their parent establishment. This percentage is modestly higher for 
pushed spinoffsﾗ—60% versus 55% for pulled spinoffsﾗ—which might be expected if many 
of the pushed spinoffs were founded to preserve the jobs of employees at their (failed) 
parents.  
The sectors and industries entered by the spinoffs in Sweden are similar to the spinoffs 
in Denmark and Brazil. In Sweden, about 10% of the pushed and pulled spinoffs entered 
in the manufacturing sector, which compares with 14% and 18% of the pushed and pulled 
spinoffs in Denmark respectively and 11% of all the spinoffs in Brazil. Breaking this 
down further in Sweden and comparing it to a breakdown reported for Brazil, about 1% 
of  the  spinoffs  in  Sweden  entered  in  high-tech  manufacturing  industries  and  28%  in 
knowledge intensive services versus 2.4% and 15% respectively of the spinoffs in Brazil. 
The  higher  percentage  of  the  Swedish  spinoffs  entering  knowledge-based  services  is 
noteworthy, but the overall sector distribution of the spinoffs in Sweden is not markedly 
different from the spinoffs in Denmark and Brazil. 
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5. Employee Transitions  
In  this  section  we  consider  transitions  of  employees  of  incumbent  firms  during  a 
representative year, 2004ﾖ–2005, to gain insight into the types of employees that joined 
new  firms.  We  analyze  transitions  for  all  employees  and  separately  for  those with a 
degree  in  science  and  engineering  (S&E),  which  enables  us  to  compare  patterns  in 
Sweden with those in the U.S. reported by Elfenbein at al. [2010]. The transition analyses 
consider  1,986,807  employees  (132,785  in  S&E)  aged  20ﾖ–64  working  in  NACE 
industries 15ﾖ–74 in 2004 (but in any industry in 2005).
9 
We analyze the rate at which employees stayed with their employer, moved to another 
incumbent firm, were part of a divestiture, switched to self-employment, exited (in the 
sense of becoming not employed in the private sector), started a pushed spinoff, started a 
new  pulled  spinoff,  or  shifted  to  another  new  firm.  Among  the  initial  employees  of 
pushed and pulled spinoffs, those coming from the parent were considered as starting 
their firm and the others were classified as shifting to another new firm.  
Our comparisons with Denmark and Brazil suggested that the incidence of spinoffs in 
Sweden was comparable to Denmark but low compared to Brazil. As reported in the next 
section, pulled spinoffs outperformed the other types of new firms in Sweden, both with 
regard to survival and employment growth. Accordingly, in our discussion we focus on 
differences  between  the  types  of  employees  that  started  pulled  versus  those  started 
pushed  spinoffs  or  shifted to other  new  firms. We also compare our  findings with a 
similar transition analysis that was conducted by Eriksson and Kuhn [2006] for Denmark, 
although they do not distinguish between movements to pulled versus pushed spinoffs. 
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5.1 Overview of Transition Frequencies  
In  Table  4,  transitions  for  all  employees  and  for  selected  employee  breakdowns  are 
reported.  Not  surprisingly,  the  vast  majority  of  employees,  76%,  do  not  change 
employers. Sixteen percent move to another incumbent firm, 6% become not employed, 
0.27% are part of a divestiture, 0.77% become self-employed (i.e., start a firm with one 
person), 0.04% move to another new firm, and 0.03% and 0.11% start pushed and pulled 
spinoffs  respectively.  Clearly,  very  few  employees  start  spinoffs  of  any  kind.  The 
comparable  numbers  for  Denmark  for  1997ﾖ–1998  are  74%  stay  with  their  current 
employer, 15.5% move to another incumbent firm, 7% become not employed, 2.5% are 
part of a divestiture, 0.4% become self-employed, 0.4% move to another new firm, and 
0.13%  start  a  spin-off  (Erikson  and  Kuhn  [2006,  p.1029]).  Bearing  in  mind  the 
differences in the rates of self-employment between the Danish and the Swedish dataset, 
these  numbers  are  surprisingly  similar.  For  example,  the  transition  rates  to  spinoffs 
(pushed and pulled) in Sweden is 0.14%, which is nearly the same rate as reported for 
Denmark.  
The next five columns reflect how transition rates in Sweden vary by selected sectors, 
occupations,  and  education.  All  types  of  movements  are  lower  for  employees  in 
manufacturing  firms  and  greater  for  employees  of  service  firms.  Employees  in 
management and specialist positions are less likely to leave their employer but more 
likely  to  move  to  pushed  and  especially  pulled  spinoffs  than  the  average  employee. 
College educated employees are slightly more likely to leave their employer but less 
likely to start pushed spinoffs and slightly less likely to start pulled spinoffs than the 
average employee.   
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The  remaining  columns  in  Table  4  reflect how transition  rates are  affected by job 
tenure, establishment size, and MNE affiliation. Tenure is defined as the number of years 
the employee has been with his employer. Tenure is often assumed to reflect the quality 
of the match between the employee and the employer, where longer tenure indicates a 
better match (Farber [1994]). Tenure is particularly interesting in the case of Sweden 
given the legal provisions that favor longer-tenured workers in cases of downsizing. Not 
surprisingly,  the  likelihood  of  all  the  transitions  declines  monotonically  with  tenure, 
although  initially  less  sharply  for  pulled  spinoffs.  For  example,  the  percentage  of 
employees that move to other new firms, become self-employed, or switch employers all 
decline by about 50% when going from employees with less than two years of tenure to 
those with 2ﾖ–5 years of tenure. The corresponding reduction for pulled spinoffs is only 
about 27%.  
A general finding in the literature is that employee turnover declines with firm size. 
Table 4 indicates that this holds for Sweden as well, with the probability of an employee 
staying with his employer monotonically increasing across the four size categories listed. 
Among the various transitions, all except being part of a divestiture and starting a pulled 
spinoff monotonically decline across the four size classes. This is perhaps not surprising 
in the case of divestitures, which are often the province of large firms, but it is notable 
that  the  likelihood  of  starting  a  spinoff  rises  going  from  the  smallest  to  the  next 
establishment size class before declining at the higher two establishment size classes.  
The last column reports transition rates for employees of MNEs. All transition rates are 
lower for employees of MNEs, including starting a pushed or pulled spinoff, than for the  
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average employee. This may be due to the larger size of MNEs, which we can control for 
in the statistical analysis of transition rates, to which we turn next.  
 
5.2 Determinants of Employee Transitions 
To  analyze  the  determinants  of  the  different  employee  transitions  we  estimate  a 
multinomial  logit  transition  model.  The  estimates  are  presented  in  Table  5.  The 
coefficient  estimates  are  relative  risk  ratios  that  reflect  the  effect  of  each  of  the 
explanatory  variables  on  the  various  transitions  relative  to  staying  with  the  same 
employer, which is the omitted category. A coefficient greater than one indicates a larger 
effect than staying with the same employer.  
We include several explanatory variables reflecting characteristics of the employee and 
his  employer  as  of  2004.  They  include  a  dummy  for  males,  age  and  age-squared,  a 
dummy for long university education (at least three years), dummies for employment in 
manufacturing and knowledge based services, and dummies for management, specialist, 
qualified, and office occupations.
10 We also control for the number of prior employers, 
tenure and tenure squared, number of employees at the employeeﾒ’s establishment and its 
squared value, a dummy for whether the employeeﾒ’s establishment experienced a drop in 
total employment in 2003ﾖ–2004, and the fraction of employees with a long university 
education (at least three years) at the employeeﾒ’s establishment. A dummy for whether 
the employee worked for an MNE is also included.  
Consider first the effects of employee characteristics. Men and employees that have 
held more jobs are significantly more likely to move to all types of new firms. Age 
significantly lowers transition rates to new firms except for starting pushed and pulled  
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spinoffs,  especially  at  younger  ages  judging  from  the  coefficient  estimates  of  the 
quadratic term. Managers and specialists are more likely to move to pushed and pulled 
spinoffs, although the coefficient for pushed  spinoff is not statistically significant for 
specialists. More educated workers are significantly more likely to switch employers or 
become self-employed but significantly less likely to start a pulled spinoff. Employees 
with  longer  tenure  are  less  likely  to  move  in  general.  This  effect  falls  off  as  tenure 
increases judging from the coefficient estimates of the quadratic term, but these effects 
are less pronounced for pushed and particularly pulled spinoffs. These patterns are largely 
consistent with the patterns reported in Table 4. 
Consider  next  the  effect  of  employer  characteristics  on  movements.  Employees  in 
manufacturing  firms  are  significantly  less  likely  and  employees  in  knowledge-based 
service firms significantly more likely to move to a new firm other than starting a pushed 
or pulled spinoff. Employees in establishments experiencing drops in employment are 
significantly more likely to change employers and be involved in a divestiture or move to 
a new firm of any type, including starting a pushed or pulled spinoff. This suggests that 
adversity can stimulate employees to find alternatives to their current employment. The 
effect of establishment size differs by type of transition. At first, the likelihood of moving 
to  a  pulled  spinoff  rises  significantly  with  size,  but  the  coefficient  estimate  of  the 
quadratic term indicates that this subsequently falls when the size becomes above about 
240 employees, whereas size significantly lowers the likelihood of changing employers, 
becoming  self-employed,  or  exiting.  These  estimates  are  consistent  with  the  patterns 
reported in Table 4, where only the percentage of workers moving to a pulled spinoff  
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initially  rises  with  establishment  size.  The  estimates  in  Table  5  also  confirm  that 
employees of MNEs are less likely to switch to new firms, including starting a spinoff.  
Overall the estimates in Table 5 are consistent with those reported for Denmark in 
Erikson and Kuhn [2006]. Other than a significant negative effect of establishment size 
on starting a spinoff at low sizes and a weak positive insignificant effect of education on 
founding a spinoff, their findings are similar to ours. Most interesting for comparison is 
the  magnitude  of  the  estimated  effects  of  employee  tenure  on  the  various  types  of 
transitions. Whereas it is difficult to lay off longer tenured workers in Sweden, Denmark 
introduced  the  so-called  ﾓ“flexicurityﾔ”  system  in  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  that  was 
designed to make it easy to hire and lay off all types of workers. Consequently, tenure 
might be expected to lower mobility more in Sweden than Denmark. Consistent with this 
expectation, the linear coefficient estimate of tenure for changing employer was 0.84 for 
Denmark compared to 0.74 for Sweden, and this difference is significant given that the 
confidence intervals of the reported estimates do not overlap. The coefficient estimates of 
tenure for the transitions to all the different types of new firms are also lower for Sweden 
than  Denmark,  consistent  with  tenure  having a  m o r e  i n h i b i t i n g  e f f e c t  o n  m o b i l i t y  i n  
Sweden than Denmark.     
 
 
5.3 Transitions of Science and Engineering Employees 
We now proceed to study the same set of transitions for employees with a S&E degree.  
These employees would be expected to be more involved in high-tech startups that can 
serve as important engines of growth than the average employee (Baumol [1993]). Our  
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benchmark is a recent study by Elfenbein et al. [2010], who use biennial survey data to 
analyze the propensity of scientists and engineers in the U.S. to found their own firms and 
the  performance  of  these  firms.  Their  most  prominent  finding  is  that  employees  of 
smaller firms are more likely to found their own (wholly-owned) firms and to found 
better-performing firms.  
We  first  computed  transition  rates  for  S&E  employees  analogous  to  those  for  all 
employees in Table 4 and found very similar patterns. To be able to compare patterns in 
Sweden with the main ones found by Elfenbein et al. [2010] for the U.S., in Table 6 we 
present the various transition probabilities in Sweden for S&E employees according to 
the same firm size categories used by Elfenbein et al. [2010]. Elfenbein et al. [2010] 
report biennial probabilities for changing employers and for starting a wholly-owned firm 
of .213 and .019 respectively. The latter includes becoming self-employed and founding a 
new firm or spinoff owned entirely by one person, which is not a category in our data. 
For Swedish S&E employees, the annual probability of switching employers is .169 and 
for becoming self-employed or starting a pushed or pulled spinoff is 0.0089. Given that 
these figures are yearly, it would appear that Swedish S&E employees change jobs more 
frequently than American S&E employees and found new firms at comparable rates. In 
terms of how firm size affects transition rates in Sweden, the probability of becoming 
self-employed declines by over 80% across the five firm size classes, which is similar for 
U.S. S&E employees, and the patterns for pushed and pulled spinoffs in Sweden are 
similar.   
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Thus, Swedish S&E employees do not appear to be markedly different from U.S. S&E 
employees or other types of Swedish workers in terms of their inclination to change jobs 
or found new firms. 
 
6. The Performance of New firms ﾖ– Survival and Employment Growth 
In this section we analyze the performance of the different types of new firms with two or 
more employees in terms of survival and employment growth.
11  Table 7 provides a broad 
overview of survival rates and employment growth at ages 3, 6, 9, and 12 for the five 
different types of new firms with two or more employees, including divestitures. Each 
entry reflects only firms that could have survived to that ageﾗ—for example, only firms 
that  entered  by  1999  could  have  survived  at  least  six  years  and  are  included  in  the 
computations for age 6. The survival rate at age a is the number of firms surviving to age 
a divided by the number that could have survived to age a. The employment rate at age a 
is the total employment of survivors at age a divided by the total initial employment of all 
firms that could have survived to age a. Also computed for each age a is a hazard rate. 
This was computed as the difference between the survival rate to age aí3 and to age a 
divided by the survival rate to age aí3. 
Consider first the patterns at age 3. Pulled spinoffs had the highest survival rate of .68, 
followed by pushed spinoffs at .61, divestitures at .58, other new firms at .56, and firms 
with all employees previously not employed at .43 (hazard rates at this age are just 1 
minus the survival rates). The employment growth rates have the same ordering. Note 
that  the  pulled  spinoff  employment  growth  rate  is  above  1,  which  indicates  that  
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employment growth at the survivors exceeded the total initial employment of those that 
exited. This is not true for any of the other types of new firms. 
At higher ages hazard rates are lower as are employment growth rates, with even the 
pulled spinoffs showing a net employment decline at ages 9 and 12. But the rankings are 
largely the same at each age, with pulled spinoffs generally having the lowest hazard rate 
and highest employment growth rate, followed by pushed spinoffs, divestitures, other 
new  firms,  and  firms  with  all  employees  previously  unemployed.  These  patterns  are 
similar to those for Denmark (Ericksson and Kuhn [2006]) and other countries (Klepper 
[2009]).  Firms  with  more  employees  from  a  common  ﾓ“parentﾔ”  firm  perform  better, 
especially when their parent does not fail. This supports the importance of inheritance of 
positive traits from a parent firm in terms of the performance of its offspring. 
 
6.1 Survival analysis 
We further analyze survival patterns by estimating piece-wise exponential firm hazard 
models that are similar to those estimated in Eriksson and Kuhn [2006]. The hazard of 
firm exit is constrained to be equal within each of the age brackets 0ﾖ–1, 2ﾖ–3, 4ﾖ–6, and 7ﾖ–
12, but is allowed to differ across the age brackets. We also allow the hazard to be a 
function of various explanatory variables that reflect characteristics of firms when they 
entered. At first these variables are constrained to affect the hazard equally at all ages but 
then are allowed to affect the hazard differently for each age bracket. Firms that survived 
to 2005 or that exited but over 50% of their employees moved to the same employer 
(which we infer were ownership changes rather than deaths) were treated as censored.  
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We first present Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the five different types of new firms 
with two or more employees in Figure 2. These curves reflect the fraction of firms of 
each type surviving to each age with censoring taken into account. As in Table 7, the 
pulled spinoffs stand out as the best performers and firms with all employees previously 
not employed as the worst, with pushed spinoffs and divestitures performing somewhat 
better than other new firms. 
The hazard estimates are reported in Table 8. The explanatory variables include: the 
age brackets; the log of the initial number of employees; the mean age of the firmﾒ’s initial 
employees and its squared value; the fraction of the firmﾒ’s initial employees that were 
males; the fraction of the firmﾒ’s initial employees with a long university education (> 3 
years); dummies for firms that entered in the manufacturing, private services, or public 
services sectors, with the omitted reference category agriculture, fishery and extraction; 
and time period dummies for 1996ﾖ–2000 and 2001ﾖ–2005, with the 1993ﾖ–1995 period 
when Sweden experienced a sharp recession the omitted reference category. Dummies 
are also included for each type of new firm, with the omitted reference group the residual 
category of other new firms. For pushed and pulled spinoffs, we also include a variable 
equal to the log of the number of employees of its parent establishment and a dummy 
equal to 1 if the spinoff entered the same two-digit industry as its parent establishment; 
both variables equal 0 for non-spinoffs. For spinoffs that entered in 1998 or later, we also 
include a dummy  equal  to 1 if  their parent  firm was an MNE  (we do not have  this 
information for earlier entrants). 
The estimates in column 1 of Table 8 constrain all the variables to have the same effect 
at  each  age.  The  coefficient  estimates  for  the  age  brackets  indicate  that  the  hazard  
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declines with age. This can be due to firm heterogeneity, with the firms most at risk of 
exit disproportionately exiting first, and/or firms learning from experience. New firms 
that are larger at the time of entry have significantly lower hazards, especially at lower 
initial firm sizes judging from the coefficient estimate of the quadratic term. New firms 
with older and more experienced employees, a higher fraction of males, and a higher 
fraction of employees with a long university education have significantly lower hazards. 
Firms  that  enter  in  manufacturing  and  public  services  have  lower  hazards  (than  the 
reference group) and firm hazards are lower after the recessionary period 1993ﾖ–1995 (the 
omitted category), especially in the period 2001ﾖ–2005.  
In terms of the firm type variables, even after controlling for all of the above variables, 
pulled spinoffs have the lowest hazards of all firms, followed by divestitures, both of 
which have significantly lower hazards than the omitted group of other new firms. The 
firms with the highest hazard are the ones with all previously not employed workers, 
which have a significantly greater hazard than the omitted group of other new firms. For 
spinoffs, entering in the same 2 digit industry as their parent significantly lowers their 
hazard whereas the size of their parent has a negative but insignificant effect on the 
hazard. Spinoffs with an MNE parent have a significantly lower hazard. 
The  estimates  in  column  2  of  Table  8  allow  the  firm  types  and  the  three  spinoff 
variables to have different effects on the hazard for each age bracket. The significantly 
lower hazards of the pulled spinoffs and the significantly higher hazard of the firms with 
all employees that previously were not employed are manifested at all ages whereas the 
significantly  lower  hazards  of  divestitures  hold  only  for  ages  0ﾖ–1.  The  significant  
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negative effect for spinoffs of entering in the same two-digit industry as their parent is 
manifested only at the youngest age brackets of 0ﾖ–1 and 2ﾖ–3 years of age.  
Overall,  the  hazard  estimates  are  similar  to  those  reported  by  Eriksson  and  Kuhn 
[2006] for Denmark. They too found that pulled spinoffs had the lowest hazards and that 
entering in the same industry as their parent lower the hazard of spinoffs at younger ages. 
One  difference  between  our  estimates  and  theirs  is  that  the  lower  hazard  of  pulled 
spinoffs shows up in Sweden at all ages, without having to take into account other factors 
such as firm heterogeneity, whereas in Denmark it persists at older ages only in frailty 
models that allow for unobserved firm heterogeneity. But the estimates for both countries 
suggest that heritage plays an important role in the performance of new firms, with firms 
performing better when more of their founders come from a common parent firm and 
they enter the same industry as their parent. Spinoffs of MNEs also performed better, 
which may reflect that their founders had a richer range of experiences to draw from to 
orient their firms (cf. Markusen [1995]). 
 
6.2 Employment growth 
Survival is one measure of performance, but survivors also differ in terms of how large 
they become.  In  this section we analyze the determinants of the  rate of employment 
growth of survivors. By definition, these regressions involve selected samples of only 
survivors. To the extent the same factors influence survival as growth, their estimated 
effects  in  growth  regressions  will  generally  be  biased  toward  zero  due  to  induced 
correlations with unobservable determinants of survival and growth.
12  
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We estimate growth regressions for firms at ages 3, 6, 9, and 12. In each, the dependent 
variable is the log of the firmﾒ’s total employment at the respective age divided by its 
initial employment at entry. The explanatory variables are the same as in the hazard 
model except for the age brackets, which are no longer relevant as the firms in each 
regression  are  all  the  same  age.  Two  sets  of  OLS  estimates  are  reported  in  Table  9 
according to whether the size of the parent establishment of spinoffs is included.  
Consider first the estimates in columns 1 to 4 that do not include the size of the parent 
establishment of spinoffs. Most of the explanatory variables are significant in all the 
regressions. As in the hazard analyses, entrants with more educated employees and a 
greater  fraction  of  males  perform  better,  growing  at  significantly  higher  rates.  Also 
similar to the hazard analyses, firms that enter in manufacturing and services perform 
better, growing at significantly higher rates. In contrast, firms with older employees grow 
at significantly lower rates whereas they had lower hazards of exit. Similarly, firms that 
are initially larger grow at significantly lower rates, whereas they had lower hazards of 
exit. This difference could be due to the construction of the dependent variable in the 
growth regressions, which includes the initial number of employees in the denominator.  
If  the  initial  number  of  employees  is  measured  with  error,  it  will  induce  a  negative 
correlation between the initial number of employees and the firmﾒ’s measured growth rate, 
imparting a negative bias to the coefficient estimate of the initial number of employees.  
In terms of the variables for the backgrounds of firms, pulled spinoffs perform best 
followed by pushed spinoffs, both of which grow at significantly higher rates than the 
omitted group of other new firms, and firms with all employees previously not employed 
performed worst, growing at significantly lower rates than the omitted group of other new  
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firms. These estimates are similar to the ones for the hazard, except now it is pushed 
spinoffs  rather  than  divestitures  that  are  the  second  best  performers.  There  is  no 
significant effect of spinoffs entering the same two-digit industry as their parent, which 
differs from the hazard analyses. The dummy for spinoffs of MNEs can only be included 
in the year 3 and year 6 regressions, as MNE affiliation is not known for older spinoffs. 
The coefficient estimate of the MNE dummy is negative and significant in the growth 
regression  for  age  6  when  parent  size  is  included  but  is  otherwise  insignificant, 
suggesting that spinoffs of MNEs grew at comparable rates to other spinoffs.  
When  the  initial  size  of  the  spinoffﾒ’s  parent  is  included  in  the  regressions,  it 
consistently has a positive and significant effect, indicating that spinoffs of larger parents 
perform better. The inclusion of this variable eliminates the significance of the pulled and 
pushed spinoff dummies except for the pulled spinoff dummy at age 3, suggesting that 
the superior growth of the spinoffs is confined to those that came from larger parents. 
These estimates support the findings of the industry studies and Hvideﾒ’s [2009] findings 
for Norway for spinoffs without a single owner and contrast with those for Denmark and 
for S&E employees in the U.S. pertaining to firms with a single owner.  
 
7. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Using  matched  employer-employee  data  spanning  over  a  decade,  we  analyzed  the 
incidence,  characteristics,  and  performance  of  different  types  of  new  firms  and 
establishments in Sweden. We focused especially on the characteristics of employees that 
found new firms of varying kinds and how the performance of the new firms relates to 
characteristics  of  their initial  employees  and their  parent  establishments.  This  section  
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discusses our main findings and conclusions, starting with the general patterns in Sweden 
and how they compare to other countries. 
Our descriptive statistics on the distribution of new firms suggest that the patterns in 
Sweden are broadly in line with those observed in other countries. Annually about 8,500 
new firms with two or more employees are founded in Sweden. Of these, about 14% are 
spinoffs, which by definition have a close attachment to a previous employer. About a 
fifth of the spinoffs are pushed in the sense that the parent establishment exited in the 
year the spinoff was founded. The largest category of new firms is a residual category of 
other  new  firms  with  no  identifiable  parent  (65%).  Similar  to  the  findings  of  other 
studies,  initially  spinoffs  are  larger  and  new  firms  with  all  previously  unemployed 
workers are smaller than all other types of new firms. Over 70% of all the new firms with 
two or more employees entered the private services sector, which reflects the general 
shift of employment towards private services taking place in most advanced economies. 
These patterns for Sweden are not markedly different from comparable ones reported for 
Denmark and Brazil. 
Given that Sweden has a high tax burden relative to many other OECD countries as 
well as several labor market policies that may inhibit employee turnover (such as the 
LIFO  principle),  it  might  be  expected  that t h e  r a t e  o f  n e w  f i r m  f o r m a t i o n w o u l d  b e  
relatively low in Sweden. However, we found that the differences between the number of 
new firms in Sweden and other countries are roughly in line with differences in country 
size. Furthermore, employee transitions rates and the proportion of pushed and pulled 
spinoffs are similar in Sweden to other countries. We did find some evidence that tenure 
has a more inhibiting effect on labor mobility (including founding a spinoff or other new  
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firm) in Sweden than in Denmark. This may be a reflection of differences in labor market 
institutions between the two countries, where employee seniority affords more protection 
in Sweden than Denmark.  
One notable pattern in Sweden over our sample period is a significant increase in the 
number of pulled spinoffs. This might be a response to the major tax reform that Sweden 
undertook in 1991, although there is yet no comparable rise in other types of new firms. 
Alternatively, the increase in pulled spinoffs might simply reflect that opportunity-based 
new firm formation increases in periods of strong economic growth, which occurred in 
Sweden toward the latter part of our sample period.  
A distinctive feature of the Swedish economy is a strong presence of MNEs, and we 
found a lower spinoff rate and lower mobility of employees in MNEs. This may reflect 
the declining attractiveness of locating advanced activities in Sweden by MNEs that has 
been documented in previous studies. The same phenomenon could also be behind the 
decline in the number of new establishments founded by existing firms outside their main 
two-digit sector in Sweden in the last years of our sample period, 2003ﾖ–2005.  
Our performance analyses showed that there are substantial differences across different 
categories of new firms regarding both survival and employment growth. While survival 
has been thoroughly studied in prior studies (although not for Sweden), there are few 
systematic analyses of employment growth after entry for different types of new firms.  
Both measures of performance are systematically related to the characteristics and work 
experience of their founders. Pulled spinoffs outperform all other types of new firms; 
they have lower hazard rates and generate more jobs at all ages than all other types of 
firms in our sample.   
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Spinoffs on average are larger and initially employ more advanced and experienced 
workers than other types of new firms. Even after controlling for these differences, pulled 
spinoffs still have significantly lower hazards than other types of new firms, especially if 
they enter the same sector as their parent. This is consistent with previous studies and 
provides additional evidence that spinoffs inherit competencies and knowledge from their 
parents, providing an advantage over other firms. We also find that the general advantage 
of spinoffs persists as firms age, although the benefit of entering the same sector as their 
parent vanishes after three years of age. The former result suggests that the competencies 
spinoffs inherit from their parents are tacit and not easily imitated. The latter result may 
reflect  that  industry-specific  knowledge  depreciates  at  a  high  rate  and/or  that  other 
entrants  quickly  learn  this  knowledge  through  (industry)  experience.  Spinoffs  with 
parents that are MNEs also perform better, which may reflect that MNEs in general have 
richer tangible and intangible resources that founders of spinoffs can draw upon. 
An interesting and novel finding is that the same factors that influence survival also 
influence  employment  growth  following  entry  through  all  ages,  with  pulled  spinoffs 
outperforming all other types of new firms in terms of employment growth. Our analysis 
of employment growth confirmed that these patterns persisted even after controlling for 
initial firm size and several characteristics of firmsﾒ’ initial employees. The higher growth 
rate of spinoffs appears, however, to be confined to spinoffs with larger parents. The 
influence of parent size on the performance of spinoffs has been debated in the literature.  
Recent studies of self-employed firms (with or without  employees)  and firms with a 
single owner tend to find that parent size has a negative effect on the performance of 
spinoffs (e.g., Sørensen and Phillips [2011], Elfenbein et al. [2010]). In contrast, our  
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results for spinoffs suggest that for firms without a single-owner, which on average are 
larger, parent size has a positive influence on performance. These contrasting findings 
call for further analyses of how parent size conditions the performance of their offspring.  
Swedenﾒ’s sluggish performance in the 1980s and early 1990s relative to other OECD 
countries raised concerns about the rate of new firm formation in Sweden. However, we 
found that the rate of creation of spinoffs and other types of new firms in Sweden is in 
line with other advanced countries. It is possible, though, that our findings reflect an 
improvement in the environment in Sweden regarding the formation of new firms since 
the early 1990s. On the other hand, past concerns about new firm formation in Sweden 
have been based on limited international comparisons of rates of self-employment, and 
our study affords a much broader perspective on new firm formation in Sweden.  
We  noted  a  number  of  characteristics  about  Sweden  that  may  bear  on  spinoffs, 
including labor market regulations and the strong presence of MNEs. Although we did 
not find  a markedly lower  spinoff  rate  and  employee  mobility in  Sweden  than  other 
countries, tenure appears to have a more inhibiting effect on mobility, including founding 
a spinoff, in Sweden than in Denmark. This warrants further study. Regarding spinoffs of 
MNEs, though we found they perform better even though MNEs are less likely to spawn 
spinoffs. MNEs account for about 90% of Swedenﾒ’s total business R&D investment and 
also employ a significant fraction of the countryﾒ’s white-collar workers in the private 
sector. Given  their significance,  measures  to facilitate spinoffs from  MNEs might be 
desirable.  On  the  other  hand,  such  measures  might  harm  the  incentives  of  MNEs  to 
invest,  and  as  such  merit  further  study.  Overall,  the  modern  environment  regarding 
spinoffs and new firm formation in Sweden appears to be healthier than perhaps generally  
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thought, but further tweaks to the labor market and policies toward MNEs might improve 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita in OECD (excl. Sweden) and Sweden 1950ﾖ–2010, in 2011 $, EKS PPPs.  























Table 1: Number of Firms by Type and year, 1993ﾖ–2005. 
Year  NE I  NE II  DIV  ONF  SE  NON-E  Push-SO  Pull-SO 
1993  207  1 919  440  5 410  32 405  1 387  495  926 
1994  276  2 670  410  6 125  50 680  2 555  275  698 
1995  236  2 223  319  5 504  42 265  1 761  197  673 
1996  361  2 325  291  4 773  40 754  1 213  214  725 
1997  599  2 371  483  5 921  47 857  1 219  319  914 
1998  286  2 785  521  5 322  43 294  1 407  219  799 
1999  219  3 090  539  5 113  42 043  1 109  219  778 
2000  205  2 267  798  6 093  42 469  1 084  251  1 010 
2001  198  2 359  562  5 542  40 969  876  283  970 
2002  221  2 432  441  4 987  39 699  855  307  942 
2003  264  2 169  383  6 038  38 395  807  311  983 
2004  188  2 013  408  5 365  41 175  891  311  972 
2005  162  2 101  428  6 330  52 042  1 204  263  1 049 
Total  3 422  30 724  6 023  72 523  554 047  16 368  3 664  11 439 
Note: NE I and II refers to new establishments by incumbent firms outside and within the incumbent firmﾒ’s 
main 2-digit NACE sector, respectively. DIV, ONF, SE and NON-E denote Divestitures, Other New 
Firm, new Self-Employed and other new firm where all employees were non-employed the prior year, 
respectively. Push-SO and Pull-SO are pushed and pulled spin-offs, respectively.  
 
Table 2: Number of Employees of Firms by Type and Year, 1993ﾖ–2005 
Year  NE I  NE II  DIV  ONF  SE  NON-E  Push-SO  Pull-SO 
1993  1 074  16 022  11 293  16 277  32 405  3 132  1 620  3 176 
1994  2 208  21 945  9 104  18 726  50 680  5 632  894  2 263 
1995  1 055  19 051  7 122  16 838  42 265  3 975  683  2 092 
1996  1 140  19 278  6 266  14 043  40 754  2 687  717  2 348 
1997  1 764  15 629  12 846  18 337  47 857  2 681  1 119  2 933 
1998  3 906  25 062  12 634  16 641  43 294  3 082  767  2 736 
1999  2 069  30 472  14 965  15 937  42 043  2 456  803  2 593 
2000  1 313  18 385  19 541  20 023  42 469  2 433  907  3 446 
2001  1 404  20 046  14 678  17 753  40 969  1 903  1 017  3 343 
2002  2 311  21 861  10 644  15 833  39 699  1 850  1 160  3 250 
2003  2 276  19 137  8 311  17 776  38 395  1 765  1 075  3 272 
2004  1 684  16 149  10 228  16 401  41 175  1 950  1 094  3 262 
2005  1 535  15 945  9 125  19 146  52 042  2 623  911  3 345 
Total  23 739  258 982  146 757  223 731  554 047  36 169  12 767  38 059 
Note: Firm acronyms in columns as in Table1. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of New Firms and Establishments across Broad Sector Categories (Percent of Total). 
 A F E   M a n u f a c t u r i n g   P r i v a t e   s e r v i c e s   P u b l i c   s e r v i c e s  
NE I  10.61  21.07  47.11  21.22 
NE II  4.42  10.12  74.84  10.62 
DIV  5.26  12.50  73.47  8.77 
ONF  9.16  7.55  75.09  8.19 
SE  29.37  4.84  48.22  17.56 
NE  13.72  8.28  71.69  6.32 
Push-SO  7.12  11.24  75.79  5.84 
Pull-SO  6.69  9.63  76.17  7.51 
Note: Firm acronyms in rows as in Table1. AFE denotes Agriculture, Fishing and Extraction (NACE 1ﾖ–
14). Manufacturing comprise NACE sectors 15ﾖ–16, Private Services 37ﾖ–74 and Public Services 75ﾖ–
99. All data are based on new private firms, and public services refer to services sectors dominated by 
public organizations.  
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Table 4: Transitions (%) 2004-2005 by Employees Employed in the Private Sector (NACE 15ﾖ–74) in 2004. 























employer  16.28  9.48  19.56  14.71  16.1  18.14  26.65  12.82  8.78  7.98  20.83  18.39  15.54  10.16  15.35 
Pushed 
spinoff  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.08  0.03  0  0  0.01 
Pulled 
spinoff  0.11  0.05  0.14  0.15  0.14  0.1  0.15  0.11 0 . 0 9  0 . 0 5   0 . 1 6   0 . 1 8   0 . 0 7   0 . 0 2   0 . 0 7  
Be 
divested  0.27  0.24  0.28  0.24  0.25  0.28  0.42  0.22  0.14  0.13  0.19  0.31  0.32  0.2  0.25 
Self-
employed  0.77  0.51  0.89  0.97  1.04  0.95  1.22  0.63  0.49  0.35  1.49  0.83  0.53  0.36  0.52 
Switch to 
new firm  0.4  0.17  0.52  0.41  0.31  0.34  0.76  0.3  0.18  0.08  1.04  0.41  0.21  0.11  0.2 
Stay with 
firm  75.72  84.4  71.53  79.98  78.43  75.6  60.2  81.3  87.02  87.38  66.67  73.42  77.59  84.53  78.42 
Exit   6.42  5.13  7.05  3.5  3.7  4.57  10.56  4.58  3.29  4.03  9.54  6.44  5.74  4.62  5.19 
Note: Manu and Serv refers to employees working in manufacturing (NACE 15ﾖ–36) and services (NACE 37ﾖ–74), respectively. Manag and Spec. is management 
and specialist occupation, respectively. Management and Specialist occupations are defined as occupation code 1 and 2, respectively, at the 1-digit SSYK 
level Specialist occupations generally comprise work tasks requiring theoretical specialist knowledge. University education refers to employees with a 
university education of at least three years. Tenure is the number of years the employee has stayed with her current employer. The intervals are in years. 
Size refers to the size in terms of employees of the establishment the employee work at. MNE and non-MNE denote whether the employee work at a firm 






Table  5:  Multinomial Logit Estimates of Transition Probabilities for Employees in Manufacturing and 
Services Sectors (NACE 15ﾖ–74), 2004/2005. 











new firm  Exit 
Tenure  0.7358***  0.8278***  0.9015***  0.7472***  0.7774***  0.7514***  0.7225*** 
  í0.0011  í0.0275  í0.0132  í0.0081  í0.0048  í0.007  í0.0017 
Tenure_sq  1.0157***  1.0067***  1.0036***  1.0138***  1.0111***  1.0122***  1.0145*** 
  í0.0001  í0.002  í0.0009  í0.0006  í0.0004  í0.0006  í0.0001 
NP_jobs  1.0874***  1.0817***  1.0706***  1.1135***  1.1120***  1.1222***  0.9950** 
  í0.0011  í0.0205  í0.01  í0.007  í0.0039  í0.0057  í0.0017 
Age  0.8929***  0.9745  1.0501**  0.9074***  0.9539***  0.9156***  0.7351*** 
  í0.0013  í0.0308  í0.0172  í0.0087  í0.0056  í0.0077  í0.0015 
Age_sq  1.0011***  1.0001  0.9991***  1.0009***  1.0007***  1.0006***  1.0038*** 
 0   í0.0004  í0.0002  í0.0001  í0.0001  í0.0001  0 
Male  1.0557***  1.2545*  1.8820*** 1.3438*** 1.4110*** 1.3882***  0.7105***
  í0.0047  í0.1233  í0.0998  í0.0419  í0.0267  í0.0356  í0.0046 
University ed.  1.2384***  0.9215  0.8064**  0.9526  1.2080***  0.9874  0.9597*** 
  í0.0091  í0.1508  í0.0658  í0.0467  í0.0371  í0.0473  í0.0119 
Management  0.9824  1.6528**  1.4215***  0.9323  1.0708*  1.034  0.5458*** 
  í0.0094  í0.2534  í0.1202  í0.0607  í0.0354  í0.0509  í0.0093 
Specialist  0.9077***  1.0706  1.8116***  0.7273***  1.2370***  0.7902***  0.5292*** 
  í0.0079  í0.1773  í0.1449  í0.0423  í0.0396  í0.0395  í0.0078 
Qualified  0.7858***  0.799  1.1185  0.9199*  0.9071***  0.7642***  0.5643*** 
  í0.0051  í0.1135  í0.0714  í0.0381  í0.0227  í0.0278  í0.0058 
Office  1.4740***  0.5641**  0.6858***  0.8684**  0.8260***  0.8023***  0.9113*** 
  í0.0092  í0.1167  í0.0675  í0.0445  í0.0273  í0.0356  í0.0091 
Manufacturing  0.7725***  1.0945  0.6266***  1.1528***  0.9575  0.6559***  0.992 
  í0.0045  í0.1273  í0.0398  í0.0391  í0.0215  í0.0234  í0.008 
KBS  1.9854***  1.247  1.0946  1.7586***  1.3772***  1.1981***  1.5128*** 
  í0.0109  í0.1557  í0.0661  í0.0641  í0.0314  í0.0379  í0.0132 
MNE  1.2714***  0.5080***  0.7484***  0.8685***  0.8152***  0.7291***  0.9869 
  í0.006  í0.0566  í0.0356  í0.0273  í0.0158  í0.0209  í0.0071 
Log size   1.0172***  14.6756***  3.2340***  1.6851***  0.7684***  0.5625***  0.7316*** 
  í0.0046  í6.7853  í0.251  í0.0601  í0.0112  í0.0114  í0.0044 
Log size_sq  0.9816***  0.5074***  0.8075***  0.9441***  1.0042*  1.0317***  1.0262*** 
  í0.0005  í0.0543  í0.0107  í0.0039  í0.002  í0.0031  í0.0007 
Neg ǻemp  1.2913***  1.5792***  1.1561**  1.3808***  1.1342***  1.2278***  1.2227*** 
  í0.0056  í0.1402  í0.0524  í0.0392  í0.0202  í0.0311  í0.0078 
Educ emp.  0.4079***  1.56  0.7532  0.9526  0.8485**  0.8127*  0.7918*** 
  í0.0067  í0.4556  í0.1166  í0.0941  í0.0471  í0.0676  í0.0194 
Pseudo Rísq  0.1013             
Note:  The table reports relative risk ratios (rrr) obtained from a multinomial logit model estimated on 
1,986,807 employees employed in sectors NACE 15ﾖ–74 in 2004. NP_jobs refer to the number of 
prior employers and University ed is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the employee has a long 
university  education  of  at  least  three  years.  Management,  Specialist,  Qualified  and  Office  are 
occupation dummy variables at the one-digit level of the SSYK classification system. KBS is a 
dummy for knowledge-based services and MNE is a dummy for whether the employee works at a 
firm that is affiliated to a MNE. Neg ǻemp is a dummy taking the value 1 if the establishment where 
the employee works experienced negative employment change between 2003 and 2004, i.e. the pair 
of years before the transition is made. Educ emp. denotes the fraction of employees with a long 
university education at the establishment where the employee works. Standard errors are presented 




Table 6: Fraction of Employees Working in Different Size-classes of Firms in 2004 and Transitions (%) 2004ﾖ–2005, Science and Engineering Employees. 
 A l l   S i z e   1 ﾖ– 2 5   S i z e   2 5 ﾖ– 1 0 0   S i z e   1 0 1 ﾖ– 1 0 0 0   S i z e   1 0 0 1 ﾖ– 5 0 0 0   S i z e   > 5 0 0 0  
Fraction of employees in 2004  ííííí 1 5 . 9 0   1 4 . 6 3   3 1 . 7 1   1 9 . 9 5   1 7 . 8 0  
Switch employer  16.94  24.4  20.49  18.26  14.44  7.81 
Pushed spin-off  0.03  0.15  0.02  0.01  0  0 
Pulled spin-off  0.10  0.23  0.17  0.11  0.02  0.02 
Be divested  0.31  0.29  0.48  0.38  0.21  0.17 
Become self-employed  0.76  1.8  0.92  0.53  0.56  0.35 
Switch to other new firm  0.29  0.77  0.34  0.18  0.19  0.12 
Stay with firm  77.69  66.3  73.71  77.33  81.05  88.03 
Exit   3.87  6.06  3.87  3.2  3.53  3.49 
Note: The table reports the fraction of employees that transcend to different states between 2004 and 2005 for all S&E employees and by size class of the firm 






















Mean size of 
survivors 
  Divestitures 
3  4 804  0.58  0.42  0.77  33.13 
6  3 003  0.39  0.33  0.60  37.94 
9  1 460  0.29  0.25  0.54  43.16 
12  440  0.22  0.24  0.35  40.04 
  Other new firms 
3  54 790  0.56  0.44  0.86  4.83 
6  38 168  0.38  0.32  0.71  5.72 
9  21 812  0.29  0.24  0.61  6.38 
12  5 410  0.22  0.23  0.50  6.71 
  New firms by non-employed 
3  13 466  0.43  0.57  0.56  2.91 
6  10 651  0.27  0.37  0.45  3.69 
9  6 916  0.19  0.30  0.37  4.39 
12  1 387  0.16  0.17  0.32  4.57 
  Pushed spinoffs 
3  2 779  0.61  0.39  0.88  5.05 
6  1 938  0.46  0.24  0.78  5.74 
9  1 181  0.35  0.23  0.66  6.20 
12  495  0.29  0.18  0.69  7.72 
  Pulled spinoffs 
3  8 435  0.68  0.32  1.20  5.89 
6  5 513  0.51  0.26  1.07  6.93 
9  3 022  0.40  0.21  0.99  8.09 
12  926  0.34  0.15  0.93  9.36 
Note: Number of potential survivors is the number of firms that entered early enough in the sample period 
to be able to reach the respective ages. The hazard rate is computed as the difference between the 
survival rate to age aí3 and to age a divided by the survival rate to age aí3. Employment fraction 
refers to employment of the group of firms surviving to a given age divided by the initial number of 
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Table 8: Coefficient Estimates of the Piecewise Exponential Hazard Model  
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Age (0ﾖ–1 year)  0.638***  0.649*** 
  í0.0529 í0.0533
Age (2ﾖ–3 year)  0.286***  0.255*** 
  í0.0535  í0.0538 
Age (4ﾖ–6 year)  í0.252***  í0.285*** 
  í0.0543  í0.0547 
Age (7ﾖ– year)  í0.802***  í0.851*** 
  í0.0578  í0.0599 
Period 2 (1996ﾖ–2000)  í0.00478  í0.00495 
  í0.0111  í0.0111 
Period 3 (2001ﾖ–2005)  í0.322***  í0.321*** 
  í0.0135  í0.0135 
Size (log)  í0.0444***  í0.0445*** 
  í0.0123  í0.0123 
Mean age  í0.0989***  í0.0982*** 
  í0.00243  í0.00243 
Mean age_sq  1.135***  1.126*** 
  í0.028  í0.028 
Share male  í0.208***  í0.207*** 
  í0.0142  í0.0142 
Share highly educated  í0.163***  í0.163*** 
  í0.0238  í0.0238 
Parent size (log)  0.000509  í0.00051 
  í0.0138  í0.0138 
MNE_parent  í0.171**  í0.144** 
  í0.0689  í0.069 
Manufacturing  í0.362***  í0.361*** 
  í0.0226  í0.0226 
Services  í0.233***  í0.232*** 
  í0.0153  í0.0153 
Public services  í0.396***  í0.396*** 
  í0.0236  í0.0236 
Same sector as parent  í0.230***  í 
  í0.0321  í 
Pulled spinoff  í0.352***  í 
  í0.0502  í 
Pushed spinoff  0.0451  í 
  í0.0468  í 
Non-employed 0 . 3 2 7 * * * í
  í0.0129  í 
Divestiture  í0.141***  í 
  í0.0331  í 
Age 0ﾖ–1 same sector  í  í0.502*** 
  í  í0.0573 
Age 2ﾖ–3 same sector  í  í0.177*** 
  í  í0.0531 
Age 4ﾖ–6 same sector  í  í0.0778 
  í  í0.0635 
Age 7 same sector  í 0 . 0 6 5 1  
  í  í0.121 
Age 0ﾖ–1 pulled spinoff  í  í0.468*** 
  í  í0.0614 
Age 2ﾖ–3 pulled spinoff  í  í0.337*** 
  í  í0.0612  
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Age 4ﾖ–6 pulled spinoff  í  í0.250*** 
  í í0.0683
Age 7 pulled spinoff  í  í0.232** 
  í  í0.113 
Age 0ﾖ–1 pushed spinoff  í 0 . 1 5 9 * *  
  í  í0.063 
Age 2ﾖ–3 pushed spinoff  í 0 . 0 1 9  
  í  í0.0664 
Age 4ﾖ–6 pushed spinoff  í  í0.0207 
  í  í0.0793 
Age 7 pushed spinoff  í  í0.0573 
  í  í0.138 
Age 0ﾖ–1 non-employed  í 0 . 3 2 8 * * *  
  í  í0.0189 
Age 2ﾖ–3 non-employed  í 0 . 3 3 6 * * *  
  í  í0.0211 
Age 4ﾖ–6 non-employed  í 0 . 2 9 8 * * *  
  í  í0.029 
Age 7 non-employed  í 0 . 3 1 6 * * *  
  í  í0.0588 
Age 0ﾖ–1 divestiture  í  í0.558*** 
  í  í0.0521 
Age 2ﾖ–3 divestiture  í 0 . 0 6 9 6  
  í  í0.0425 
Age 4ﾖ–6 divestiture  í 0 . 0 2 7 2  
  í  í0.0536 
Age 7 divestiture  í 0 . 0 5 1 2  
  í í0.11
# of observations  254 626  254 626 




Table 9: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Employment Growth from the Initial Year up to 3, 6, 9 and 12 Years, respectively.  
  Year 3  Year 6  Year 9  Year 12  Year 3  Year 6  Year 9  Year 12 
Initial size (log)  í0.0606***  í0.0698***  í0.0607***  í0.145***  í0.0635***  í0.0769***  í0.0701***  í0.163*** 
  í0.00767  í0.0127  í0.0209  í0.0466  í0.00768  í0.0127  í0.021  í0.0469 
Mean age  í0.00489**  í0.0188***  í0.0260***  í0.0295*  í0.00494**  í0.0187***  í0.0264***  í0.0294* 
  í0.0023  í0.00406  í0.00708  í0.0159  í0.0023  í0.00406  í0.00708  í0.0159 
Mean age sq  í0.0722**  0.0272  0.0839  0.149  í0.0719**  0.0252  0.0873  0.145 
  í0.0282  í0.0504  í0.0891  í0.202  í0.0282  í0.0504  í0.089  í0.202 
Share male  0.0908***  0.0996***  0.0988***  0.225***  0.0897***  0.0968***  0.0959***  0.221*** 
  í0.00979  í0.0159  í0.0262  í0.0627  í0.00979  í0.0159  í0.0262  í0.0626 
Share highly educated  0.0598***  0.0872***  0.0941**  0.0262  0.0541***  0.0761***  0.0807*  0.00748 
  í0.0145  í0.0256  í0.042  í0.105  í0.0146  í0.0256  í0.0421  í0.105 
Parent size (log)  í í í í 0.0348***  0.0716***  0.0780***  0.119*** 
  í í í í í0.00678  í0.0109  í0.0172  í0.0392 
MNE_parent  í0.00988  í0.0846  í í í0.0442  í0.162**  í í
  í0.0291  í0.0739  í í í0.0299  í0.0748  í í
Manufacturing  0.216***  0.286***  0.357***  0.423***  0.217***  0.287***  0.358***  0.417*** 
  í0.0155  í0.0237  í0.0365  í0.0822  í0.0155  í0.0237  í0.0365  í0.0821 
Services  0.140***  0.199***  0.255***  0.291***  0.141***  0.200***  0.257***  0.288*** 
  í0.012  í0.0183  í0.0281  í0.0649  í0.012  í0.0183  í0.0281  í0.0648 
Public services  0.132***  0.148***  0.193***  0.326***  0.131***  0.146***  0.188***  0.321*** 
  í0.0162  í0.0254  í0.0416  í0.1  í0.0162  í0.0254  í0.0416  í0.1 
Same sector as parent  0.0176  í0.00799  0.0173  0.0689  0.0317*  0.0206  0.0411  0.0832 
  í0.0164  í0.0259  í0.0416  í0.082  í0.0166  í0.0263  í0.0419  í0.0819 
Pulled spinoff  0.182***  0.199***  0.170***  0.196***  0.0725***  í0.0263  í0.0721  í0.15 
  í0.0141  í0.0222  í0.0359  í0.0715  í0.0256  í0.041  í0.0643  í0.135 
Pushed spinoff  0.0532***  0.0787**  0.0697  0.198**  í0.03  í0.0921**  í0.113*  í0.0777 
  í0.0203  í0.0312  í0.0478  í0.0888  í0.026  í0.0406  í0.0624  í0.127 
Divestiture  0.0311  0.0441  0.104*  0.184  0.0366*  0.0572*  0.122**  0.218* 
  í0.02  í0.0337  í0.0572  í0.127  í0.02  í0.0337  í0.0572  í0.127 
Non-employed  í0.110***  í0.0916***  í0.0743***  í0.116*  í0.110***  í0.0932***  í0.0764***  í0.118* 
  í0.0103  í0.0162  í0.0256  í0.0658  í0.0103  í0.0162  í0.0256  í0.0656 
# of observations  46431  22207  9657  1978  46431  22207  9657  1978 
R square  0.038  0.049  0.054  0.066  0.039  0.051  0.056  0.07 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the number of employees at year 3, 6, 9 and 12, respectively, since entry and initial employment. Only 
firms surviving up to each corresponding age are included. Standard errors are presented below each parameter estimate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
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1 A number of studies in the 1990s and early 2000s on the contribution of different firms to employment in Sweden also showed that the contribution of high-
growth firms to employment was relatively limited in Sweden (Davidsson et al. [1994, 1996]; Davidsson and Delmar [2000]). This raised concern that small and 
young firms in Sweden face difficulties in trying to expand or that they are not willing to grow (Henrekson [2001]). 
2 In 2001, a rule was established that small firms with a maximum of 10 employees could disregard the LIFO principle for two employees. This rule was 
implemented to stimulate employment in small firms and make it easier for them to keep key personnel. Using matched employer-employee data for the period 
1996-2005, von Below and Skogman Thoursie [2010] found modest effects of the new rule on labor turnover at smaller firms.  
3 We make use of the so-called FAD (Företagens och Arbetsställens Dynamik) coding scheme for establishments to distinguish various types of new firms based 
on worker flows (see Andersson and Arvidsson 2011).  
4 For all newly self-employed individuals that previously worked for another firm, some may have previously had a minority of their income from their self-
employed business.   
5 In the period 2003 to 2005, though, when the number of the new establishments created by existing firms outside their main industry fell by about a third, this 
percentage dropped from 72% to 55%. 
6 Among the pulled and pushed spinoffs combined, 15% had parents that were MNEs, which is somewhat higher than the fraction of all Swedish firms with four 
or more employees (the minimum size of parents given the way we defined spinoffs) that were MNEs of 11%. 
7 For example, Davis and Henrekson [1999] present data on non-agricultural self-employment as a fraction of civilian employment for OECD countries in 1973, 
1979, 1986 and 1990, respectively. In all years, Sweden has a significantly lower self-employment rate than Denmark.   
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8 The pattern of spinoffs also reveals a shift from manufacturing to services. Of all spinoffs (pushed and pulled) with parent establishments in the manufacturing 
sector (about 14%), more than 50% end up in services sectors. However, among spinoffs with parent establishments in services sectors, about 96% end up in 
services. 
9The sample of employees is restricted to those for which we have education (length and specialization) information. This information is absent for about 56,000 
employees aged 20-64 in NACE industries 15-74 in 2004.   
10 Specialist  and  qualified  occupations  comprise  jobs  that  typically  require  theoretical  specialist  knowledge  and  shorter  university  education  respectively. 
Occupational categories are based on the one-digit Swedish (SSYK) occupation coding scheme. 
11 As in Erikson and Kuhn [2006], self-employed firms are not included in the survival analysis. We exclude these firms from the survival analysis for data 
comparability reasons. An employee may switch to/from self-employment depending on whether her business income exceeds her labor income, which makes 
survival comparisons to the other types of new firms (with at least two employees) difficult.  
12 A firm that survives to a particular age that is low on characteristics conducive to survival (and growth) will on average have higher compensating values of 
unobservables conducive to survival (and growth). This will induce a negative correlation between these unobservable and observable determinants of growth, 
which will bias their coefficient estimates in the growth regressions toward zero. CIRCLE ELECTRONIC WORKING PAPERS SERIES (EWP) 
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